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ABSTRACT 
The charities or philanthropies are generally the result of private initiative. They design and 
provide an apparently easily substitutable service for which there is ample competition. They 
collect funds from charitable donors to finance community-based projects. The continuity of 
the relationship to the resource providers, and to the community groups, both of which could 
be seen as “customers”, is temporary, and hard to stabilize. It requires trust, yet the rarity of 
the encounter itself and the lack of closeness destroys trust. Surviving in such an environment 
is a constant challenge.  How do these organizations manage to adapt to change and survive 
is the topic of this text.  
Based on a detailed study of the operations and strategic decision-making of Centraide in 
Greater Montreal, the author suggests that dependency on the environment is not a crippling 
curse, but rather can be a stimulus to adaptation. The example of two major changes over a 
10 year period shows that strategic management in high dependency situations requires a 
continual attention to the organization’s relationship with the forces in its environment, thus 
making change a permanent feature of management and forcing a continuous management of 
the process by which change takes place. Where managers put the emphasis on the content of 
change, challenges arise that may be fatal to the managers involved, and detrimental to the 
organization’s ability to compete. This is indeed the basic proposition of the author : for 
philanthropies, dependency is a strategy that may prove more effective in managing complex 
situations than autonomy, provided that more attention is given to strategic decisions process 
rather than to their content.  
The first part of the text is a discussion of the relevant strategic management literature, 
proposes a conceptual framework which structures the text. The second part describes the 
strategic decision-making process in Centraide, and its character, by relating two major 
change attempts. The first change was undertaken in 1990 and led to a major crisis, while the 
second was formally started in 1997, with some surprising success. This will lead to a 
discussion of the strategic management and change of highly dependent organizations, and to 
a few concluding comments and implications for research and practice. 
 
 
Taïeb Hafsi 
HEC Montreal 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his groundbreaking work, Thompson (1967) proposed that “technologies and environments are 
major sources of uncertainty for organizations, and that differences in those dimensions will result 
in differences in organizations”. Ever since, the contingency theory propositions have been tested 
and generally verified in a variety of settings (see Vankatraman and Prescott, 1990). It is today 
accepted that organizations in order to survive have to design their operations and structures to 
reduce the effect of environmental uncertainty. This can be done by sealing or buffering the 
organizational core from outside influences. The art of organizational design and structuring, as 
the art of managing organizations, is seen as the art of reducing the organizational dependency on 
its environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Organizations that are too dependent on their 
environment are either appendix organizations without much room for strategic choice, or 
temporary ones (Rhenman, 1973 ; Hrebeniak and Joyce, 1985), without much manoeuvring 
ability. 
With rare exceptions (Pascale & Athos, 1981), the call for increasing the organization’s power 
over its environment, or reducing the power of its environment over it, is generalized (Crozier & 
Friedberg, 1977). Yet, there are situations where organizations are apparently almost totally 
dependent on their environment without any significant survival difficulties. Most of these 
situations have been built to be durable and generate mutual dependency despite appearances or 
the actors’ wishes. For example, public sector organizations and state-owned firms situations have 
been abundantly discussed (Anastassopoulos, 1981 ; Vernon & Aharoni, 1981 ; Hafsi & Thomas, 
1989 ; Crozier, 1963) and suggest that dependency is a situation to which there are interesting 
responses.  
In particular, the case of charities or philanthropies is telling. These organizations are generally the 
result of private initiative. They design and provide an apparently easily substitutable service for 
which there is ample competition. They collect funds from charitable donors to finance 
community-based projects. The continuity of the relationship to the resource providers, and to the 
community groups, both of which could be seen as “ customers ”, is temporary, and hard to 
stabilize. It requires trust, yet the rarity of the encounter itself and the lack of closeness destroys 
trust. Surviving in such an environment is a constant challenge. Recently, such an entrenched 
philanthropy as United Way of America has seen its image affected by an apparent 
misappropriation of resources by a top manager, leading to a sharp, if temporary, drop of 
contributions for all the regional United Ways throughout the country.  Yet these organizations, 
like churches and universities, are long-lasting. How do they manage to adapt to change and 
survive is the topic of this article. 
Based on a detailed study of the operations and strategic decision-making of Centraide in Greater 
Montreal, this article suggests that dependency on the environment is not a crippling curse, but 
rather can be a stimulus to adaptation. The example of two major changes over a 10 year period 
shows that strategic management in high dependency situations requires a continual attention to 
the organization’s relationship with the forces in its environment, thus making change a permanent 
feature of management and forcing a continuous management of the process by which change 
takes place. Where managers put the emphasis on the content of change, challenges arise that may 
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be fatal to the managers involved, and detrimental to the organization’s ability to compete. This is 
indeed our basic proposition : For philanthropies, dependency is a strategy that may prove more 
effective in managing complex situations than autonomy, provided that more attention is given to 
strategic decisions process rather than to their content. The article is divided into five parts. The 
first part, a discussion of the relevant strategic management literature, proposes a conceptual 
framework which structures this article. The second part describes the strategic decision-making 
process in Centraide, and its character, by relating two major change attempts. The first change 
was undertaken in 1990 and led to a major crisis, while the second was formally started in 1997, 
with some surprising success. This will lead to a discussion of the strategic management and 
change of highly dependent organizations, and to a few concluding comments and implications for 
research and practice. 
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1. ENVIRONMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEPENDENCY : AN OVERVIEW 
1.1. Organizations and environment 
Thompson’s (1967) and Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) powerful conceptualizations of the 
relationship between organization and environment have generated a whole industry of research on 
the topic, and competing claims. Several conceptualizations (Lenz and Engledow, 1986) compete 
with each other. The dominant industrial organization model (Porter, 1980) has been challenged 
by a stakeholder perspective (Freeman, 1984), a population ecology perspective (Aldrich, 1979 ; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1984), and a resource dependency perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), 
all of which attempt to justify a deterministic stance that conceive of the organization’s behavior 
as being correlated with the nature of its environment. Another historical perspective confirms the 
importance of the environment-organizational behavior relationship (Chandler, 1962 ; Greiner, 
1998).  A sequence of stages, driven by punctuated equilibrium or slow-paced evolution, suggests 
that the organization changes under pressure to adapt to (historically) predictable environmental 
movements (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
Although ubiquitous, dependency is frequently seen as a maladie (Thompson, 1967 ; Mintzberg, 
1978 ; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). If an organization is dependent on its environment, it may be 
close to death or so goes the implicit argument. The delicate relationship with the environment is 
often overlooked to emphasize the more definite statements of fit. Dependency, for example, is in 
Thompson’s words « hated by organizations, subject to norms of rationality, and is to be 
avoided ». Yet, some empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Sawyerr (1993) has shown that, in 
Nigeria, one cannot speak of dependency and uncertainty indiscriminately. Actually, there may be 
a high dependency on some segments, but control over other segments. Similarly, Tan and 
Litschert (1994), in their study of the electronics industry in China, suggests that although the 
environment plays a key role in Chinese firms’ performance, it does not cripple or debilitate, it 
simply makes some strategies or organizational behaviors more relevant or more effective than 
others. They have shown for example that in an economy in transition, such as China’s, defensive 
strategies, which are seen elsewhere as a poor choice, provide a high performance.  
A different perspective emphasizes perceptions. The environment, according to Weick (1979) is in 
the eye of the beholder, who then “ enacts ” it. Managers watching the same environment may see 
different things and forces, which leads them to different courses of action, some to adapt to the 
environment, others to change it. Such a theory is not incompatible with the others, but provides 
managers with a powerful justification for a voluntaristic attitude. It even suggests that the 
diffusion of knowledge through business schools and consulting firms may have socialized 
managers to some of the environment models rather than others (Homburg, Workman & Krohmer, 
1999). This is consistent with new institutional theorists of organization’s proposition, as we shall 
see later. 
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These theories lead to different ways of looking at an organization’s strategic management. The 
more deterministic models - industrial organization, stakeholders and ecology - may understate the 
managers’ ability to produce change, while the enactment model may overstate it. Looking for a 
niche or for the right stakeholders’ protection is the essence of strategy. The more dependent one 
is, the more one’s action outcome is predetermined. In this work, we intend to take issue with 
these views. We shall argue that dependency is not only inevitable, it is necessary for survival as it 
increases the organization sensitivity to the environment and its ability to adapt to it. The history 
of Centraide shows how a strategy taking into account the organization’s dependency can lead to 
some surprising levels of control over the environment. We shall call upon the institutional theory 
of organization to describe and offer an interpretation of our findings. 
The institutional theory of organization studies the effect of institutions and institutionalization on 
the behavior of organizations (Selznick, 1957 ; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). The early version of 
the theory was Selznick’s description of institutionalization as a dominant process among 
organizations that leads to predictable behaviour. He then suggested that given the power of 
institutionalization, it should be leadership’s main concern, and contribution. The more recent 
work shifts the focus to the effect of broader, externally-borne institutions on the behaviour of 
organizations. It has been stimulated by Meyer and Rowan’s proposition that organizations which 
conform to institutionalized environment-borne rules improve their ability to survive, and by 
Powell & DiMaggio’s (1983) assertion that the institutional setting generates isomorphism on the 
part of organizations. The literature is revealing that the power of institutions is such that structural 
forms, and managerial behaviour can be predicted, when the institutional situation is understood 
(Meyer, 1977 ; Meyer and Scott 1987, 1992 ; Fligstein, 1987; Scott, 1995). Because the idea of 
institution is so broad1, the theory’s postulates and findings cross and match those mentioned 
earlier, and in a sense provide a powerful synthesis.  
In the early institutional currents, the issues that dominate research cover such areas as influences, 
values, moral frames, and ways through which interest groups divert the formal mission of an 
organization. The more recent currents are more concerned about legitimacy, taken-for-granted 
norms, routines, and cognitive, normative and regulating dimensions of institutions (Scott, 2001). 
The new institutional theory of organization provides clues about the unexplained behavior of 
organizations, by exploring significant dimensions of social organizational experience (Zucker, 
1987). Oliver (1996) suggested that institutional influences can be combined with resource 
acquisition needs in an effort to describe actual behaviour; going further Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996) have offered a Constrained-efficiency model to take into account the dual search for 
efficiency, as described in most industrial organization research, and the search for legitimacy as 
examplified in institutional theory. New institutional theorists have recently argued that the 
apparent anti-change bias of the institutional theory should be turned upside-down. Institutional 
theories are actually a powerful way to understand the sources of resistance to change in an 
organization, and thus comprehending institutional impediments to change is a good start to 
prepare and act to effect change (Scott, 2001, Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002). 
 
1  Institutional theorists (Berger & Luckman, 1967 ; Zucker, 1987 ; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) propose that institutions are 
socially constructed templates for action, generated and maintained through on-going interactions. They provide the 
framework and procedures within which organizations function. Burns and Flam (1987) define institutions as shared rules 
that categorize social actors, their activities and relationships.  
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The study of institutions and their effects highlights several other issues (Farashahi, 2001). First, 
there is a need to take into account the overlapping effects of different levels of institutions (e.g., 
national, industry, strategic groups) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Second, the effect of institutions 
is not a one-way street. Institutions are also influenced by the organizations that they influence. 
Many researchers have highlighted this reciprocal impact of organizations on institutional norms 
(Giddens, 1987 ; Barley & Tolbert, 1997 ; Jepperson, 1991). Third, at the more micro level, the 
different parts of an organization may respond differently to the same institutional pressures, thus 
providing differing degrees of institutionalization within an organization (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996). In this sense, Institutionalization is really a process, rather than a state (Zucker, 1991). 
Finally, it may sometimes be important to give a special status to national context. Specific 
situations, such as those of developing countries or those of strong cultural environments, may 
have important additional effects (Chen et al, 1998 ; Jorgensen, 1989 ; Orru et al, 1991; 
Peng & Luo, 2000). Many theoretical questions are raised by such a view. At the top of these, one 
could suggest two : (1) How do taken-for-granted institutional influences interact with more 
visible efficiency and effectiveness concerns to explain behaviour ? (2) How are key actors made 
aware of these taken-for-granted influences, and how do they change them ? 
Non-profit organizations are often deliberate attempts to fit within an institutional context to 
resolve a specific social-political conundrum. Given the close relationships that a non-profit 
organization entertains with its environment, the previous findings should describe and explain 
their behaviour. We argue that non profit organizations are dominated by values and norms that 
define their environment, which should be reflected in the way they function. However, these 
organizations do influence these values and norms, which should be reflected in what and how 
environmental actors contribute to these organizations governance or operations. Given the 
complexity of the activities of these organisations we would also expect that different parts of a 
non-profit organization are influenced differently by their institutional setting. 
Institutional approaches to understanding the behaviour of organizations are more appropriate 
where large complex systems are concerned, where cause-effect relationships are obscure and 
elude any actor’s intuitive leaps. In particular, they are more useful where one studies a field of 
organizational action, whether an industry, a region, or a nation. Such studies usually require an 
understanding of the historical dynamics that led to the existing institutional setting. Historical 
dynamics, multiplicity of organizations and of actors are the ingredients that lead to taken-for-
granted norms, values, and cognitive biases. Among others, Leblebici et al (1991), have shown 
how an historical institutional study could explain the evolution of the US radio-broadcasting 
industry ; Dacin (1997) has studied the evolution of the population of Finnish newspapers in the 
19th century to explain the effect of nationalism on the creation of Finnish-language newspapers ; 
Holm (1995) described the slow transformation of the Norwegian fisheries from the 1920s to the 
1990s, by looking at the special role played by the Mandated sales organizations (MSOs), a most 
powerful institution in the history of Norwegian fisheries ; Hoffman (1999) studied environment-
related federal legal cases, faced by the U.S. chemical industry, from 1962 to 1993, to show how 
competing values and norms may simultaneously exist and come to bear on corporate behaviour. 
In this paper, we are following on these traditions to build theory on the relationship between 
institutional norms and values and the success of a change effort. The study of a large non-profit 
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organization history is appropriate, because of its complexity. One cannot understand the behavior 
of Centraide without replacing it in a broader system that includes both donors and beneficiaries, 
which brings to the table a large number of actors and organisations, a whole organizational field 
(Scott, 2001). 
 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE IN HIGH DEPENDENCY ENVIRONMENTS : THE CASE OF PHILANTHROPY 
 
 
7
 
 
 
 
2. DATA AND METHODS 
This research, exploring how to understand the ability of completely dependent organizations to 
survive and prosper for a long period of time, builds on a tradition of phenomenological research 
that has been popularized by the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967). Building on Schutz 
(1967), they suggest that social inquiry may call for methodological devices that are adhoc and 
specifically designed to the situation studied. Schutz had argued that “ the constructs used by the 
social scientists are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely constructs of the 
constructs made by actors on the social scene, whose behavior the scientist observes and tries to 
explain in accordance with the procedural rule of his science ” (Bowring, 2000). Building on the 
idea that reality is socially constructed, and that the role of sociology of knowledge is to analyze 
the process through which this occurs, Burger and Luckmann posit that phenomenological 
analysis, a purely descriptive and empirical method, is the most appropriate method to discover 
how “ subjective meanings become objective faclicities ”. It is therefore a phenomenological 
approach that has been taken here. We were looking for explanations to a complex set of 
questions. Rich information and data were needed, and the research process itself could not be 
programmed with precision. A grounded theory approach (Creswell, 1997) was followed. We have 
conducted a long term historical study of strategic management in Centraide, a community 
philanthropy serving the Greater Montreal area. More specifically, we focused on the study of two 
major change attempts. The study was conducted during the period from 1997 to 2001. Side 
elements of the study are still going on. The study included interviews with key opinion leaders, 
with the executive group of Centraide, its board, and its employees, and with a cross section of 
leaders of the community-based organizations that are part of the Centraide system, in total over 
200 informants. The study included also a study of internal documents and of the history of the 
organization. The interview guide which was used with the group of informants is provided as an 
Appendix. The guide was used as a broad framework and not all questions were asked of all the 
respondents. Following Glaser and Strauss’ procedure (1967), we stopped asking those questions, 
where we believed that we had exhausted their purpose, and moved to those that had not been 
addressed completely. With that, we believe that we had a clear portrait of the change efforts, 
which are described below.  
The informants included 48 opinion leaders, representing all strands of Greater Montreal’s civil 
society and government. In addition, 35 of the professionals of Centraide were interviewed, most 
of them in groups of 5 to 10, and 10 of them individually.  Also, all the top and middle managers 
of the organization, including the President and her, six direct reports, and the 10 third level 
managers. Finally, were included in the study 13 community organizations, in which at least two 
persons, generally the general managers and a key volunteer or staff person, were interviewed. The 
study also included the participation to numerous internal meetings, meetings involving 
Centraide’s volunteer governance system, and meetings with outside partners. Table 1 summarizes 
the sample of informants questioned, and the format used. To this we have to add attendance to 5 
board meetings, 6 meetings of the Allocation board (in charge of allocating resources to the 
community organizations), 2 staff meetings of Centraide (with every employee attending), 2 
annual general assemblies of Centraide, 5 community organizations general assemblies, several 
meetings involving Centraide and partner organizations (community organizations, government 
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agencies, charitable foundations, other united ways, etc.), and several social events organized by 
Centraide or the community organizations. 
The findings have been summarized in many different ways in other documents. To keep the 
presentation length reasonable, we have chosen here to propose a case discussion of the changes as 
they came out of the interviews and discussions with individuals and groups of informant. 
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3. TALES OF TWO CHANGE ATTEMPTS : SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this work we are more specifically focusing on the two most important change attempts that 
have taken place in the last fifteen years. One of the attempts is labelled “ Hard change ”, because 
it was essentially dominated by top management ideas, with little attention given to the ability of 
the system (individuals, groups and organizations), or its willingness to adjust. This change 
attempt has basically failed to carry the organization to a new situation. The second attempt, a 
“ Soft change ”, has proceeded very cautiously and, although it is too early to call in a definite 
way, the present consensus among managers and the research team involved in this work is that it 
has succeeded in transforming profoundly the whole system. In this section, the two attempts are 
described. The whole process will be discussed in the following section. 
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4. THEORY-DRIVEN, TOP DOMINATED “ HARD CHANGE ” 
4.1. Centraide : The early days  
In the 1960s and earlier, religious-based charities were dominant in Montreal. Donors, especially 
large and corporate donors were under siege to contribute to each of the charities funds. The 
number of solicitations was increasing fast, and soon the main charities realized that they were all 
chasing the same limited number of dollars. Donors, especially large ones, were complaining 
about the disorganized solicitation process and calling for a unification of charities campaigns. In 
1970, the five largest charity organizations in Montreal2, decided to merge their fund raising 
activities into the Greater Montreal Federations Campaign organization. Each of the federations 
was still to keep its fund distribution activities. The campaign funds were to be shared on the basis 
of the relative individual campaign results prior to the merger.  
In 1974, the allied federations (except the Red Cross and the ACJS) decided to transfer to the 
GMFC their planning, budgeting and fund distribution activities. In 1975, it was replaced by 
Centraide, which was to be modeled on other United Way organizations in North America, and in 
particular distribute funds on the basis of social priorities rather than religious affiliation. The early 
years were difficult, but soon Centraide became the main private philanthropy in the Greater 
Montreal.  
Centraide was a “ special animal ”, as a joint-venture of organizations which spread across 
different religions (Christian catholic, protestant and orthodox, and Jewish), and linguistic 
(especially French and English) groups. These groups had a history of mistrust and sometimes 
difficult relationships. Language was the important divide. Traditionally, Anglophone and 
Francophone montrealers did not see eye to eye. They competed for resources and power in all 
forums. Here, for the first time they had decided to cooperate, and do it first at the fund raising and 
solicitation stage, and then to increase and emphasize the community-centred volunteer work. 
Therefore, from the beginning, Centraide became a special ground, a place where in contrast to 
past practices every group would attempt to cooperate rather than fight. Centraide managers soon 
found themselves in the middle of all the tensions that the complex and highly diverse 
communities of Greater Montreal generated. Clearly, to survive the new organization had to 
satisfy every group. There was first the fundraising, which had to be done in accordance with 
everyone’s best wishes. Then there was the allocation of the resources to the various community 
organizations, which had to be equitable. There were also the relationships with the various 
communities and community-based organizations, which had to be close and considerate. There 
was finally the governance system and management of the newly created organization, which had 
to leave enough influence and power to the various groups. 
 
2  The United Red Feather (1921), The Federation of Catholic Community Services (1932), the Federation of French-
Canadian Charities (1933), the Combined Health Association, The South Shore Welfare Federation Council (1965), which 
were later joined by the Allied Jewish Community Services (AJCS) of Montreal and the Canadian Red Cross Society. 
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In addition to these contextual factors, Centraide was also to be an efficient vehicle for raising 
funds and distributing them to the needy. This meant that the organization would have to be both 
modest in size, as far as permanent staff was concerned, and large and complex where volunteer 
work is taken into account.  
The early years, until late in the 1970s, were essentially devoted to reproducing the fundraising 
practices of the previous charities and working to redistribute them according to the priorities of 
these charities. The mission statement up of 1966 and 1974 captured the essence of the 
organization : 
 Raising funds (1966) 
 Raising funds and allocating them according to priorities (1974) 
In 1976, the pull toward the community-based work is reaffirmed. The organization is looking for 
a new legitimacy and for a definition that clearly delineates its emphasis on poverty reduction and 
social transformation. The priority commission affirms that “ Centraide should become the 
crossroad of dynamic and committed communities ”, and suggests that the allocation of resources 
should emphasize “ supporting human communities, agencies and organizations, which are based 
on voluntary work, commitment and participation, to face their own problem and work toward 
resolving them and improving their standard of life ”. In 1980, this was made official policy in the 
mission statement, which read as follows : 
Centraide is a community-based organization whose purpose is to respond, 
through all the organizations that it supports, to important social problems, 
and to promote, stimulate and strengthen, in the Greater Montreal, the 
participation of the community as another way to respond to these problems. 
Centraide proposes a concrete response to this social project by inviting, 
every year, each citizen to contribute financially to a great campaign of 
public contributions, and by financing organizations and projects, based on 
participation and volunteer work, to respond in the most appropriate way to 
the pressing problems of our society. 
The 1980 mission statement is elaborate and defines Centraide’s activities as a balance between 
fundraising and the promotion of community work. It confirms the strengthening of the 
organization, which now is able to gather increasing amounts of money every year ($ 9.8 million 
in 1977, and $ 13.3 million in 1982), to finance a large number of community organizations (92 in 
1977, and 156 in 1982), and to mobilize a large number of volunteers (40,000 in 1982). 
4.2. The Community work pull 
The managers of Centraide get all their motivation from the proximity to the community 
organizations that face the actual social problems within the community. They are led to a greater 
involvement in that side of the business. Both permanent employees and volunteers would not 
identify with the donors. Rather, they were attracted to the poignant fate of the poor and the needy. 
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They saw themselves as being at the service of those directly involved in relieving societal ills and 
pains. 
In the 1980s, more research is done into social trends and a report is published in 1989. A more 
militant stance is adopted and Centraide files reports and briefs with several governmental 
commissions (on voluntary work, on municipalities, on mental health, on the financing of  
voluntary organizations, etc.). In 1984 a colloquium on voluntary work is organized. Finally, 
numerous initiatives are taken to get closer to the community-based organizations funded by 
Centraide. In particular, an annual conference is organized, an internal journal is distributed to all 
the Centraide network members, and Centraide becomes a militant social activist of the region, 
organizing thematic meetings, gathering support for various social services and programs, and 
joining forces with others to push for a socially responsible government and economic 
environment. 
As a result, Centraide raises more money, engages more volunteers, and is popular among the 
citizens of the region. Notoriety research shows that at the end of the decade Centraide is 
spontaneously mentioned by over 50 % of the population, a jump of 20 percentage points from the 
beginning of the decade. The 1985 mission statement sums up the new nature of the organization : 
Promoting, in the social domain, mutual support, sharing and community 
and volunteer commitment. 
Nowhere fundraising is mentioned, which highlights the organization’s character during the 
period, and its imbalance. Pulled by its two main activities : fundraising and community work,  
Centraide has moved from a focus on raising money, with little concern about its uses, all the way 
to the uses of money and its attendant attention to community work, with little attention to 
fundraising. This will lead to the organization first major crisis. 
4.3. The 1990-1991 crisis 
All throughout the 1980s, the President was Jacques Miltant3. A forceful intellectual mind, he 
believed in community and mutual support, and saw as his mission to make Centraide the best 
instrument for the development of a gentle, caring, and compassionate community in the Greater 
Montreal. But to achieve anything in Centraide, Jacques Miltant had to contend with a slow and 
aggravating decision-making process, in which volunteers and permanent staff debated endlessly. 
With time, he grew impatient with the need to consult. He “ knew better than anybody else what 
needed to be done ”, and had the support of many intellectuals and academics. He started forcing 
his decisions onto the delicate volunteer-based governance system of the organization, alienating 
key stakeholders, in particular the volunteers themselves and the community-based organizations. 
The estranged donors were also complaining that they were left out of the picture at Centraide. 
From being a universal table, Centraide was increasingly seen as an ideologically bent 
organization, dominated by social analyses and theoreticians. 
 
3 Name disguised. 
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The only way for him to control the system was to change the governance system or the people 
who were involved in it. He could do neither, and instead faced a dismissal vote in the Board. The 
whole organization was shaken to its foundations, but ultimately the community reclaimed the 
organization and board members indicated clearly their desire to balance the pulls between fund 
raising and community work. In addition, it was stated that Centraide was not really in the 
business of actually doing the community world. 
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5. PRAGMATIC, CONSENSUS-BASED “SOFT CHANGE” 
The new president, a woman engineer, Michelle Newsome4, with an experience in public relations 
and politics, but who had never been involved in managing philanthropy, was chosen to bring a 
fresh no-nonsense perspective to the business of Centraide. Large donors were important to the 
organization and should not be scared away by militant, ideologically-minded behavior. Instead, 
the removal of the former president suggested that attention to fundraising, and an arm’s length 
relationships with community-centred group were, at least implicitly, emphasized. 
The new president was “ coldly ” welcomed to the organization. Professionals and managers alike 
could not comprehend how she could make sense of Centraide’s business and manage it properly. 
They were resistant and unwilling to cooperate. Instead of dealing with the internal situation, she 
decided to focus on the external world, giving more visibility to Centraide and cajoling donors into 
giving more. Campaigns became the most important business of Centraide, and were managed so 
that corporations and important citizens of the Greater Montreal would be visibly involved. The 
campaign was a major public relations drive, involving a large number of volunteers (actually 
about 20,000), and positioning Centraide as a major player in the philanthropy business. As a 
result, Centraide’s attractiveness for concerned citizens increased significantly. The number of 
corporate executives, professionals, union officials, opinion leaders, and common citizens 
involved in the campaign increased steadily as did the amounts of money collected.  
The campaign became also the annual occasion for the communities’s expression of concern for 
those in need, and a concrete moment of inter-group solidarity. During the two-month campaign, 
emotions run high, specific contributions, community work and in general all philanthropies gain 
added visibility on all the communication media. Centraide plays the match-maker role and tends 
to keep a low profile. This provides it with added credibility and legitimacy among all those 
concerned by the Greater Montreal social balance. 
The emphasis on external stakeholders, especially donors, changed also the power relationships 
within. The campaign team grew in importance and presence, while the team in charge of fund 
allocation to the beneficiaries dwindled and was confined to generally bureaucratic procedures. 
The campaign expenses were twice those devoted to community analyses and fund allocation. But, 
that was not considered different from what other similar organizations did. 
Campaign professionals were generally highly enthousiastic about Centraide, because they shared 
in the visibility and, in their job, were to work closely with Montreal’s and Quebec’s5 key decision 
makers. They shared also in the objectives of the organization and felt proud to contribute to its 
development. In contrast, the Allocation professionals were depressed. They were frustrated to be 
doing the bureaucratic job, without a chance to play a more active role in helping community-
based organizations achieve their poverty-related objectives. 
 
4  Name disguised. 
5  The Provincial Government controlled the flow of funds and Quebec City was the political capital of the Province. 
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Centraide president was given the credit for this flurry of activity and for the related prestige and 
respect that Centraide enjoyed throughout the community and among all decision-makers, be they 
corporate executives, union officials and most politicians. Her power and influence among 
professionals and managers was in 2000 at its peak. 
5.1. The Campaign 
Michelle Newsome expressed early in her tenure three basic principles : (1) involve as many 
stakeholders in the decision-making process as possible, (2) build bridges among people, and (3) 
keep a low profile, appear modest in the process. Centraide slowly developed an important ability 
to get very different people at the same table tackling Centraide’s tasks. In particular, the 
Campaign process was revealing. The Campaign was formally under the control of a Cabinet, a 
group of high level executives from prominent firms, or public institutions of Greater Montreal. 
These executives were also key decision-makers for corporate donations.  
In building the Cabinet, first there was the appointment, at the end of a yearly campaign, of the 
following year’s campaign chairperson, generally a well-known business personality. The 
chairperson would in turn, with Centraide’s guidance and help, do the hiring of most of the other 
cabinet members. The campaign would then become the Cabinet’s responsibility. Centraide 
professionals provided the support and recording staff. Centraide also organized all the cabinet 
meetings and ensured that each cabinet member kept focused on his specific goals. Personal pride 
and the unusually high need for achievement of most executives led to a healthy level of 
interpersonal rivalry in achieving Centraide’s set targets. In the ten years since her appointment, 
Michelle Newsome has never had any difficulty finding a campaign chairperson, and the 
campaign gross revenues kept growing, reaching $ 38 million in the Fall of 2001. 
5.2. Dialogue Tables 
In the non-profit social organization world, there are many different interested actors, each with a 
different agenda and eager to move on it. Competing ideas and programs fight each other in a 
mostly chaotic field. Government agencies, which provide a large part of the funding to 
community organizations, are particularly heavy-handed. They pursue bureaucratic aims, which 
sometimes may be at odds, and rarely attempt to coordinate their interventions.  
Centraide, on the other hand, sees itself as a helping hand to the community and in a generally 
pragmatic way tries to resolve problems as they emerge. It finds itself frequently in the position of 
building bridges among everyone involved. Because Centraide sees itself as being only the 
community instrument for getting the money to the needy, it does not have a specific social 
agenda, and is therefore seen as compatible by all the various interests groups. It has therefore 
become “ the only table where everybody is willing to sit. ”  
Slowly, the process has been structured to include various dialogue tables, where broad questions 
could be discussed by all the actors concerned. For example, there are tables for each of the main 
social issues on which everybody agrees. At the tables, community organizations are brought 
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together with donors and sometimes with opinion leaders and concerned citizens, to suggest ways 
to deal with a specific issue, say youth ills and troubles, weakened families, or injured rights. 
Sometimes, groups within society may be at odds, and Centraide is then put to the test by both 
sides. For example, rights of convicts groups are always at odds with police union concerns. 
Centraide is threatened on both sides, the police accusing it of giving to people who would then 
use funds to combat justice, the rights activists accusing it of selling off to the more powerful. On 
many of these conflicts, Centraide has worked at bringing the protagonists to the table, and looked 
for a solution with them. This may have led sometimes to abandoning one or the other of the 
concerns, but without the usual acrimony that comes with these conflicts, the losing party usually 
ending up understanding the situation of Centraide, and de facto accepting the judgment that 
comes out of the debate. 
The results of a broad interview schedule, conducted by the researchers, with key opinion leaders 
including all the segments of the community, Centraide was widely seen as a “ fair table ”, and a 
necessary mediator among the multiple interests represented in the community. Everyone, 
including key national politicians, appreciated its low-key, “ low-impact ” interventions, and 
marvelled at the results. “ It is a remarkable situation where the weakest gets everyone to do what 
they would not do otherwise ”. 
5.3. Supporting the community organizations, not imposing upon them 
There is a fine line between helping and imposing one’s views on community organizations.  As 
mentioned earlier, government agencies in particular provide significant amounts of money, but 
come with a clear agenda from government, frequently forcing cash-trapped organizations to do 
what they were not set up to do, and neglect their own objectives. The dominant philosophy at 
Centraide was that the community organization’s objectives are the community’s objectives and 
the best that they could do is help these organizations achieve them. 
Yet, helping often goes along with imposing rules and procedures, and monitoring goal 
achievement, and in so doing the effects on community organizations can be counter-intuitive. The 
study of several community organizations shows that institutional theory is here at work ; they 
tend to deviate from their goals in trying to satisfy the donors requirements (Benouniche, 2000). 
More specifically, they spend much more time satisfying donors reporting and other requirements 
than caring for their targeted beneficiaries. 
Centraide feels also dependent on its community organizations. Its credibility is related to its 
approval by these organizations. Furthermore, the donors look for real impact on poverty and 
social distress. The only way to satisfy them is to work hand in hand with the community 
organizations. The level of cooperation of these organizations with Centraide increases its ability 
to show impact, and legitimacy, to donors. In the last few years, many of these organizations 
participate actively to the annual campaign, organizing visits for donors and describing to large 
groups of individual and corporate donors their contribution to the relief of social ills. Still, the 
only way to reduce the burden on community organizations is to reduce the amount of paperwork 
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required and to train professionals dealing with them so that they do not willingly or unwillingly 
interfere with their operations.  
But even that is hard to achieve. Centraide’s professionals are highly visible individuals in the 
community. They tend to be well known among opinion leaders, and their dedication to 
community work is part of the system. Yet, they are used to the existing rules and procedures and 
relent when it comes to being more flexible and “ serving ” rather than “ imposing ”. It is very 
hard to impose upon them new behavior patterns. Persuasion is the central mechanism for getting 
things done. So, Centraide is also dependent on its professional’s willingness to cooperate. This 
makes any change process very soft. The President must work to gain approval and commitment 
inside as well. But, if she does so, the dedication achieved among professionals is usually 
considerable, because no one is allowed by social norms to resist what is perceived to be the 
community’s good. 
In early 2001, Centraide was succeeding on all fronts. The support of business, government, 
academia, community leaders, and its own professionals, was very high. Even the objectives set 
ten years ago by the former president are being taken up, with everyone’s support. In particular, 
Centraide is now getting prominent donors to get involved in understanding and solving the 
community problems, changing thus considerably the relationships among the system’s 
components (donors, community organizations and Centraide). Very few organizations enjoy such 
a degree of control over their stakeholders, and this is done quite softly, leaving everyone in 
control of its own decision to support or not the organization.  
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6. DISCUSSION, CONCEPTUALIZATION 
In this section we discuss further what dependence means, why it is possible for an organization to 
achieve more and in general do better when it accepts its dependence on others and acts 
accordingly. Finally, we argue that the dependence-based management is more effective than the 
illusive search for independence.  
6.1. From extremes to balance 
Before 1991, the President was emphasizing the social contribution aspect of Centraide’s mission, 
and acted on the assumption that this was sufficient enough to allow him to move without clear 
approval from key stakeholders. He was actually acting on the premise that he was the only one 
legitimate in making the judgement as to what is appropriate for Centraide, and tried simply to 
impose his decisions to everyone concerned. This explains why most of the stakeholders allied 
against him and rejected his decisions. Therefore, we propose : 
Proposition 1 :  
In a philanthropy organization6, top management emphasis on strategic decision content leads to 
crises and an inability to pursue the organization’s objectives. 
Starting in 1991, the new President was insecure on many counts. First, she  did not know much 
about community work, nor about philanthropy. Second, she was not a professional manager. 
Finally, she knew very well that most of the various groups could bring her down, if they chose to 
do so.  She was clearly aware of her total dependence on everyone’s willingness to help her 
achieve the organization’s goals.  
The President moved first to get approval from the board of directors. This meant emphasizing the 
board’s expressed concerns that the organization was moving away from its primary goal : 
fundraising. She worked with everyone to increase Centraide’s ability to manage the Campaign. 
To gain acceptance, she needed to give the campaign back to donors’ representatives. The Cabinet 
of the campaign, the leading group in the campaign, was chosen so that key business and public 
sector decision makers would dominate. Success of the campaign was presented to be their work. 
The organization of the campaign was such that everyone of the cabinet members was to be aware 
of what the others were doing and occasionally had to present his own program to the others. This 
created a healthy level of competition among cabinet members, but also instilled, in their decision-
making behaviour, the important premise that Centraide’s ability to help the poor and destitute was 
entirely dependent on their performance. All the decisions that they could make were inevitably in 
 
6  To stick with our research, we label Philanthropy organization, a non-profit organization which plays a pivotal 
intermediary role in a system aimed at bringing donor’s contributions to bear on society’s ills and help deal with them.  
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the direction of the campaign success. So, in practice, Centraide did not need to worry much about 
the campaign results, it became the cabinet’s concern. 
Once the campaign was on track to increasing success, managers became aware of the need to give 
more attention to community organizations. Centraide, as an organization, and Michelle Newsome 
in particular, were aware that unless organizations in the network were satisfied, they would go 
their own way for fundraising, raising doubts among donors about Centraide’s legitimacy to speak 
for them. First, it was obvious that these organizations were quite fragile, and needed regular 
support. Second, it was clear that if they were constantly on the look for money, they would 
neglect their objectives. Centraide decided to commit to basic recurrent funding that would ensure 
survival of its network. The community organizations became the focus of much attention, and 
Centraide increasingly associated them to its decision-making process. They were also implicated 
in the effort to make the social problems of the community more visible, which they did with a lot 
of emotion and talent. This justifies the following propositions : 
Proposition 2 :  
Where philanthropy organization key stakeholders’ representatives are brought into the 
decision process, and their interests balanced, their commitment to the organization’s goals 
and survival increases. 
Proposition 3 :  
Balance among needs of donors and those of beneficiaries is a basic norm in the philanthropy 
system, which when transgressed can lead to confrontation among stakeholders, crises and to 
a drift away from a philanthropy organization’s purposes. 
6.2. Reciprocal Institutional theory at work 
Clearly, the behavior of Centraide was dominated by the President’s sense of vulnerability or lack 
of it. The organization worked at understanding who was to be satisfied in its environment and 
why. The behavior of the organization was then shaped to achieve that. The preferences of key 
stakeholders were not really imbedded in specific institutional rules or norms. They were not even 
clearly expressed by these stakeholders. Centraide actually worked at creating the institutions that 
would both facilitate the clarification of norms and possibly shape them. The structure and 
operations of Centraide, in particular the Board, the Cabinet and their operations, as well as the 
various “ dialogue tables ”, constituted the institutional framework within which Centraide’s 
behavior was defined, and controlled.  
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Proposition 4 :  
The organizational structure arrangements of philanthropy reflect the various forces that 
come to bear on the successful accomplishment of its goals. 
The important feature of this framework is that it was both designed and directly “ managed ” by 
Centraide. It is tempting for a President to feel all powerful and start actually managing “ alone ” 
the organization’s strategic behavior. That is what happened during Jacques Miltant’s tenure. 
During Michelle Newsome’s tenure, the institution was managed in a more democratic way. Even 
if Centraide’s influence on these institutions is important, it is accepted only if it is perceived to be 
legitimate, thus if it takes into account the various stakeholders’ perspectives, and is seen as 
balancing them properly.  
Centraide defines the parameters of its own actions, but it has to make sure that they are 
understood by key stakeholders and that their opinions and reservations are dealt with explicitly. 
In a sense, institutional theory works here in reverse. It is the focal organization that shapes the 
institutions and manages them (Giddens, 1987 ; Barley & Tolbert, 1997 ; Jepperson, 1991). It is 
apparently an unusual situation, but Centraide may be proposing that extreme dependence suggests 
another way of looking at the relationships with the existing institutional framework: A dependent 
organization is in the business of understanding better the forces that have a bearing on its actions, 
and design itself to fit right into these forces, to be part of them, and then have the legitimacy to 
guide their decisions as far as they apply to it. 
Proposition 5 :  
Philanthropy is dominated by norms and values of its environment’s key actors. But in turn, 
given its central role in the decision making process, it has an important effect on how these 
norms and values are understood and how, over time, they are modified. 
The forces that come to bear on Centraide are also unequal and imbalanced. The donors, for 
example, are clearly very visible and also very active. They are basically the “ concerned society ”, 
helping the “ troubled society ”. But Centraide has to work constantly for balancing the influences 
of the two parts. For example, the effectiveness of helping requires bringing to the table the groups 
and individuals being helped, and listening to them. In so doing, Centraide designs the premises of 
the decision making process of everyone in the system (Simon, 1945). Where Centraide went so 
far as to neglect the donors, as was the case in the early 1990s, it has lost its ability to act. Where it 
goes so far as to neglect the organizations being helped, as was the case occasionally, more 
specifically in the late 1990s, it loses the meaning of its own action and as consequence its 
legitimacy (Atangana-Abe, 2002). This has led to many community organizations and corporate 
donors by-passing Centraide to deal directly with each other, and in the process creating another 
sort of imbalance and injustice, by leading to the neglect of many less visible causes. 
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In this case, managing the institutional framework is a “ soft management ” issue. It is an attempt 
to “ imitate ” key stakeholders enough to acquire the right to act on their behalf, and organize their 
interventions and interactions into the business of Centraide. Soft management requires that this 
ability to act is constantly checked and adjusted. If Centraide is seen to manage away from the 
desires of stakeholders, resistance builds up and the support is quickly lost. Where management is 
led to “ hard ” managing the interventions and interactions of key stakeholders with Centraide’s 
business, it loses quickly its legitimacy and ability to effect any strategic management and change.  
Proposition 6 :  
The norms and values that come to bear on philanthropy’s decision are general enough to 
provide room for negotiation and reconciliation among competing claims. 
6.3. Managing the system 
Centraide’s management has “ internalized ” the organization’s environment by structuring its 
governance system, so that all key stakeholders participate directly to decision-making. But in 
Simon’s words (1945, 1997) « they have kept important control over the setting of premises. The 
control of premises is legitimate because of the need to maintain balance among all the claims. 
Where it is seen to be abused, it again loses legitimacy and leads to strong rejection by most 
stakeholders, as was the case in the 1990-1991 crises ».  
The acute awareness and sensitivity to Centraide’s total vulnerability led top managers to “ enact” 
an environment so demanding that the only way to respond to its demands is to design the 
organization so that the environment is brought inside. They also designed a management system 
in which a constant attention to environmental forces is center stage, to ensure that no important 
factors are overlooked that may pull the organization apart. For example, in recent years, many 
corporate donors have been tempted to “ go direct ” or demand that their donations be 
“ designated ” to meet a specific need or to be given to a specific community organization. To 
respond to the trend, Centraide is in the process of redesigning itself completely so as to make 
more visible the community organizations and the causes financed. It is also emphasizing its 
relationship with these organizations to be able to conduct “ impact measurement ” and “ project 
financing ”. The latter can be offered also as a partial alternative to traditional financing of 
community organizations. It will help bring many of the latter together to increase territorial 
identification and address important issues that are beyond smaller organizations capabilities. 
Project financing is also attractive to corporate and employee group donors who want to assess the 
impact of their contributions, and identify with specific needs. Which explains that : 
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Proposition 7 :  
The governance system of philanthropy reflects the nature and the state of the environmental 
forces that come to bear on its decisions. 
We propose that it is because this sense of vulnerability permeates all the organization’s activities 
that Centraide’s managers are able to keep their vigilant watch over their key stakeholders’ need 
changes. With this in mind, the propositions stated earlier are offered to suggest the process by 
which philanthropy’s managers handle the dependency of their organization and their control over 
the forces that are supposed to dominate their decisions. These propositions can be used as a basis 
for a large sample research.  
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The search for autonomy is an important tenet of strategic decision-making. Dependence is often 
seen as crippling the managers’ ability to position the organization in its environment or to 
navigate within such an environment. The environment is generally seen as deterministic. 
Organization and strategic management theorists (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) generally 
recommend gaining power over the environment to balance dependence. Fit then is mostly seen as 
a balance of power (Miller, 1981). Given their almost total dependence on donors, community 
organizations, volunteers, opinion leaders and most other stakeholders, non-profit organization, 
especially those that have a bridging role like Centraide would appear completely unable to 
function.  
The history of Centraide shows that the environment is not completely distinct from the 
organization. It can be “ internalized ”. Centraide manages the interplay of the various 
stakeholders and structure itself to make this interplay an internal affair. The acute sense of 
vulnerability of its leadership has led to the building of an institutional setting in which the 
organization plays a leading role.  This role is however constantly put to the test. Any attempt to 
overlook the contributions of stakeholders is dangerous.  
There is no question that there is dependence and it is considerable. But attention to stakeholders’ 
needs leads to organizational and managerial practices that can make out of dependence strength. 
It helps bring in all the stakeholders and internalize their demands. In a sense, it is designing the 
decision-making process so that Centraide has control over the premises, leaving everyone else to 
come up with specific decisions (Simon, 1983, 1997). In so doing Centraide increases the 
rationality of its system, and reduces confrontation with its key stakeholders. 
In Centraide’s system change becomes necessarily a soft issue, in which all stakeholders debate 
and give shape to what the organization should be. Top management is in the business of 
managing the interactions and ensuring that the need for balance is legitimate and accepted by 
everyone concerned. In the last decade of the 20th Century, they have succeeded in maintaining 
everyone’s cooperation, despite undertaking fundamental changes. 
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Table 1 : 
Research Informants 
TYPE NUMBER OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED & FORMAT 
DETAILS ABOUT 
INTERVIEWEES 
Board 11* individual interviews 
 
3 corporate executives 
1 major donor 
1 city official 
1 union official 
3 experienced volunteers 
1 Church pastor 
Centraide President 
 
Opinion leaders 48* individual interviews 
 
Political leaders (4) 
Union leaders (5) 
Community leaders (17) 
Corporate executives (12) 
Intellectuals and thinkers(10) 
 
Top management 5* individual interviews President and direct reports 
Middle management 6 individual interviews Second level managers 
Professionals 
35 of which 15 individual 
Interviews and 4 group 
interviews 
7 working on Allocations 
19 working on Campaign 
9 others 
Community organizations 65 individual interviews 
 
Top managers (13) 
Volunteers (34) 
Board members (7) 
Staff (13) 
 
 
*  Board members were all considered opinion leaders and are thus included in that category too. The president is also included in the 
 top management. 
 
